The situation is more complex than it is often presented in public discourse. The migration crises of recent years have placed additional pressure on European security and administrative systems. Under such conditions, the risk inevitably increases that individuals linked to foreign states or non-state actors may exploit these vulnerabilities in the interests of authoritarian regimes.
This is not about people’s origin, but about systemic exposure. When screening procedures are overwhelmed or constrained by legal and ethical standards, gaps emerge. Verifying the background of individuals arriving from closed or authoritarian systems is inherently difficult, often due to the lack of reliable records or verifiable data.
These conditions create opportunities for hybrid influence operations — ranging from disinformation campaigns to attempts at destabilization through social tension, coordinated strikes, or disruptions targeting critical infrastructure. Such scenarios are well-documented in contemporary hybrid warfare doctrines.
A structural challenge for Europe is that open societies, built on rule of law and human rights, have limited tools for rapid and coercive responses. For example, methods like polygraph testing are restricted by legal and ethical frameworks. This is not a flaw, but a deliberate choice — one that, however, creates asymmetry when facing actors that do not operate under comparable constraints.
Russia and affiliated networks have systematically worked for decades to expand their influence beyond their borders. This includes traditional intelligence operations, as well as the use of diaspora networks, media channels, and economic leverage. Much of this groundwork dates back to the Soviet era and has been adapted to modern conditions.
It is important to stress that a conventional military takeover of Europe is not the primary concern. A far more effective strategy is gradual internal erosion: undermining trust in institutions, amplifying polarization, and influencing political processes. In such an environment, even relatively small but well-organized groups can have disproportionate impact.
Another complicating factor is the presence within European political and business circles of individuals who, for various reasons, display tolerance or affinity toward authoritarian regimes. This weakens the capacity for a unified and decisive response.
I do not claim to advise European leaders, but it is evident that some opportunities for timely action have already been missed. Under these circumstances, Ukraine’s ability to withstand aggression becomes a critical factor for European security.
Supporting Ukraine is not only a matter of solidarity — it is a matter of strategic self-interest for Europe. It is about containing the expansion of authoritarian influence and preserving a rules-based international order.
This requires not symbolic gestures, but consistent and substantial support, including advanced defense capabilities. The war in Ukraine has long surpassed the scope of a regional conflict; it is a stress test for the resilience of democratic systems globally.
Skepticism toward such assessments has existed before. However, the experience of recent decades suggests that underestimating risks and delaying decisions only increases the cost of future consequences.
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